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2Non-technical summary
In the paper we analyze the business cycles within the EU-15, the EU-11 as well as
within CU-core countries consisting of Austria, Belgium, G many the Netherlands,
and France. The criteria for classifying a country as a core country are its membership
in the EMS and stable bilateral exchange rates over a longer period of tim. Alth ugh
Luxembourg would clearly classify as a core country as well, we exclude it from the
core group because of its special status as an international banking place. Our main
interest focuses on the question whether there are statistically significant differnces in
the per capita growth rates between the EU-states or not. To provide an answer to this
question we use One-Way- as well as Two-Way-Anova techniques to decompose the
variation in the series into time-specific effects which are common to all countries,
country-specific characteristics, and into shocks which are country-specific. A com-
parison of the size of the different sources of variation gives insights of the importance
of the various shocks. These results are used to draw some conclusions about future
stabilization policies in EMU.
The main results of the paper are that there are considerable country-specific effects
for the EU-15 and the EU-11, but not for the core countries. Within the EU-11 coun-
try-specific effects dominate common shocks for Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, and
Portugal. Given that these countries are „small“ in their contribution to he GDP of
EU-11, it seems likely that EMU as a whole will not seriously be disturbed by country-
specific shocks hitting these countries. But the opposite will of course not be true.
Furthermore, for EU-15 we find no significant country characteristics which leads to
the conclusion that the European economies are not moving on diverging rowth paths
in the long run. But over a business cycle divergence may well occur because persi-
stence in the growth rates differs across countries. Considered as a whole, the starting
conditions for EMU are quite good and there is no serious indication of an inherent
instability in the system with respect to output growth.
3Abstract
The paper investigates the business cycle relationships between the EU-15, the EU-11, as well
as the EU-core countries for the period 1971 to 1997. Emphasis is put on the question whether
there is a synchronization in the national business cycles or not. Using One-way- and Two-
way-Anova techniques the results show that country-specific shocks are important to the
smaller countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, and Finland. But for most of the
EMU-members common shocks are much more important than country-specific shocks. In
addition there is no indication of significant differences in the national growth rates, i.e. the
European countries do not move along diverging growth paths. Nevertheless, departures over
the business cycles are possible because persistence in output growth differs across countries.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Beitrag wird der konjunkturelle Zusammenhang zwischen den EU-15, den EU-11 und
den “Kern”-EU-Staaten für den Zeitraum von 1971 bis 1997 dahingehend untersucht, ob zwis-
chen den Staaten ein konjunktureller Gleichlauf besteht oder nicht. Eine One-Way- und eine
Two-Way-Anova-Analyse zeigt, daß insbesondere für die kleineren Länder länderspezifische
Schocks eine beträchtliche B deutung haben. Demgegenüber dominieren bei den Kernländern
deutlich die “common shocks”. Da keine länderspezifischen Unterschiede f ststellbar waren,
kann daraus der Schluß gezogen werden, daß sich die uropäischen Staaten entlang eines ein-
heitlichen Wachstumspfades entwickeln. Gleichwohl können kurz- bis mittelfristige Ab-
weichungen eintreten, da die Persistenz im Output für die einzelnen Länder unterschiedlich ist.
4I. Introduction
Since the decision of the members of the EU to constitute a monetary union there was
much debate in the literature whether Europe is an optimal currency area or not1. De-
spite of the possible advantages of a common currency several authors addressed the
question how the necessary adjustment processes will be in EMU when exogenous
shocks hit the economy. Contrary to the past several policy instruments are no longer
available to the member states, namely the exchange rate as well as the monetary pol-
icy instruments. This loss of national instruments which were partly useful in the past
to protect one country against foreign shocks, calls for new adjustment mechanisms as
shock absorbers2. These new adjustment mechanisms are the more in need the more
various types of shocks hit the economies differently. It is likely that most of the bur-
den of adjustment in the future will translate into the labor markets3. Labor mobility
and flexible wages across countries and regions then will have to serve as shock ab-
sorbers. But compared with the United States (Blanchard and Katz 1992) European
labor market mobility is rather low. An alternative and/or additional adjustment
mechanism might use capital mobility to absorb adverse shocks across the nations
(Mueller and Heinemann 1999).
But despite of the different origins of the shocks another requirement for a stable EMU
is the synchronization of the national business cycles. Whether there is already a
European business cycle has, among others, been analyzed by Artis and Zhang (1995)
and Karras (1996). Artis and Zhang analyze whether the former ERM countries in-
cluding  Italy moved towards the German business cycle. They conclude that there was
a high degree of synchronicity among the countries, using deviations from trend of
industrial production as a measure of business cycle fluctuations. Karras (1996) looked
at the European OECD countries for the period 1951-90 by decomposing fluctuations
in real GDP into common and country-specific shocks. He finds that country-specific
                                                 
1 To mention only a few, see e.g.Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, 1996), Bayoumi and Prasad (1997), Capo-
rale and Pittis (1998), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993), Gros (1996), Ricci (1997) and the survey con-
ducted by Bean (1992).
2 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the exchange rates as well as the interest rates on bilateral growth
differentials as well as on bilateral differentials in unemployment rates, see Mueller and Buscher (1999).
3 See Puhani (1999) for details on this issue.
5shocks were more important than the common shocks in the past. From these findings
Karras  concludes that a common European currency union will have few stabilization
benefits. Using the same methodology Bay umi and Prasad (1997) and Stockman
(1988) compare U.S. and European industries and areas to provide an answer whether
Europe will be an optimum currency area. Bayoumi and Prasad draw attention to two
criteria, namely the level of industrial diversification and the relative importance of
region- and industry-specific shocks on the one hand, and the level of labor market
integration in the U.S. and Europe on the other. They find that there are no important
differences in the industrial diversification as well as in the nature of shocks for the
two regions. But important differences are reported for interregional labor mobility as
one future adjustment mechanism for the European countries. From this lack of mobil-
ity they conclude that large wage differentials across European countries could remain
in the currency union without disturbing the system as a whole. Furthermore, these
wage differentials across Europe should be kept flexible to avoid disruptions from
country-specific shocks4.
Analyzing the EMU member states with respect to the question whether they form an
optimum currency area or not raises at least three different aspects: the first relates to
the question whether shocks will hit EMU symmetrically or asymmetrically5. The sec-
ond point refers to the propagation mechanism of the different shocks and the third
issue is concerned with a disaggregated view in the sense that different sectors of the
economy will be affected differently when facing exogenous shocks. Closely related to
this point is the question whether the member states obey a rather homogenous struc-
ture of the economy or if spatial diversification prevails. In the present paper we re-
strict ourselves to the first question. The second aspect how different shocks are
transmitted through the economies relates to the SVAR approach. In this paper we do
not follow this line. One reason for using alternative statistical procedures is that most
of the SVAR literature on this issue deals with models for single countries, so that
there is no direct interrelationship between the different countries analyzed.
                                                 
4 Additional results on regional convergence aswell as regional specialization are given in Abraham and Van
Rompuy (1992) and De Nardis, Goglio and Malgarini (1996). An extensive survey on this issue is provided by
Dohse and Krieger-Boden (1998).
6The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we start with some summary
statistics and analyze the question whether European business cycles are synchronous
or not. Section 3 emphasizes the differences in the amplitudes of the European busi-
ness cycles by performing a One-Way-ANOVA. Decomposing the variations in the
growth rates into country-specific effects, country-specific shocks as well as common
shocks proceeds in section four by estimating a balanced panel with fixed effects.
Conclusions are drawn in the final section. This section also contains some suggestions
for future research.
II. The Economic Performance of EU-15
Before proceeding to the empirical results we first briefly discuss the data used in the
study and some of its characteristics. All data are annual and taken from the appendix
of the Annual Report of the German Council of Economic Experts (1998/99). The use
of annual data is dictated by the non-availability of quarterly data for the whole period,
especially for the small countries such as Luxembourg and Ireland. We start our em-
pirical investigation in the first half of the seventies when the former Bretton Woods
system came under serious pressure. Because the data listed in the “International Ta-
bles” of the Annual Report are given in national currencies, we transformed them into
Ecu, using the annual average Ecu xchange rate in 19916. For national GDP data we
deflated the figures by population and then transformed them into growth rates by
taking the first differences of the logs.7  In the case of Germany we only used West
German data to avoid problems in the estimations due to the break in the series in 1991
                                                                                                                                              
5 For a recent discussion on asymmetric shocks and their possible implications, ee Belke and Gros (1988).
6 To choose a base year for the conversion i to Ecu is to some extend arbitrary. Our choice for the year 1991
results from the fact that all the European data expressed in real terms published in the appendix of the German
Council of Economic Advisers use 1991 as the base year.
7 Using per capita data instead of GDP growth rates for the economy as a whole takes account of several pro-
blems. First, per capita growth is highly correlated with GDP-growth. The lowest correlation coefficient applies
to West Germany with 0.93 for the period 1971 to 1997 andthe coefficient is highest for Finland with 0.999.
Second, per capita data account for migration effects which became important during the last years as a conse-
quence of the fall of the iron curtain. Third, using per capita data we can apply the same data set when briefly
discussing some convergence properties across the European countries.
7when considering German data. Yet another argument to exclude East Germany is the
still special situation  there and the unusual structure of the economy compared with
other industrialized countries.
Figure 1: Real per capita GDP-growth in EU-15
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the real per capita GDP growth for EU-15 as a whole
as well as for the single countries. The shaded areas represent recessionary phases in
8Figure 1 continued: Real per capita GDP-growth in EU-15
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the business cycle with EU-15 taken as the reference.8 Tabl  1 below presents some
summary statistics such as mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values,
and the Jarque-Bera statistic to test for normality.
                                                 
8 We define a recessionary phase as the time periods with negative changes in the real GDP per capita s one
criteria. The second criteria relates to the time period before the trough is reached. Clearly, there is some arbi-
trariness in the definition. But for the purpose at hand it should only serve as a rough guide for the countries
under investigation.
9Common to all European countries is the recession in 1975 after the first oil crisis.
Most of the countries reached the trough in 1975, except for Sweden, Finland, and
Ireland. Figure 1 also reveals that the crisis hit the economies quite differently. The
decline in per capita growth ranges from roughly zero to about –8 percent (Portugal).
Table 1: Summary Statistics 1971 – 1997 – Per Capita GDP Growth
Country Mean Standard Max Min JB-Stat
Deviation
______________________________________________________________________
EU-15 0.019 0.016 0.052 -0.017 1.133
EU-11 0.019 0.017 0.049 -0.018 2.011
Austria 0.024 0.018 0.055 -0.005 0.968
Belgium 0.021 0.019 0.056 -0.019 0.408
West Germany 0.018 0.020 0.057 -0.028 0.975
France 0.019 0.015 0.045 -0.018 0.720
Finland 0.023 0.033 0.068 -0.018 10.709*
Ireland 0.038 0.028 0.095 -0.010 0.931
Italy 0.022 0.020 0.058 -0.028 0.611
Luxembourg 0.030 0.033 0.091 -0.079 11.077*
Netherlands 0.018 0.015 0.042 -0.016 2.044
Portugal 0.028 0.036 0.106 -0.082 7.709**
Spain 0.023 0.022 0.069 -0.014 0.806
Denmark 0.019 0.019 0.060 -0.014 0.465
Sweden 0.013 0.018 0.039 -0.028 2.334
Great Britain 0.019 0.023 0.069 -0.024 0.568
Greece 0.021 0.028 0.071 -0.041 0.164
______________________________________________________________________
Note: JB-Stat = Jarque-Bera Statistic to test for normality. *, (**) indicates that normal distribution is rejected
at the 1 (5) % level of significance
The second major recession in the beginning of the eighties is much more alike to the
countries, but this time Portugal is as an exception. The final big slowdown in 1991 –
92 hits the Finnish economy most, but leaves Denmark and Luxembourg nearly unaf-
fected. Therefore, Figure 1 suggests that business cycles in Europe are much alike in
the timing, but considerable differences exist to the extend single economies are hit by
10
a recession. The second point to be noted is that for the smaller countries there is some
indication that they could isolate their developments at least partly from the major
European economies. From 1971 to 1997 the EU-states grew at a rate of 1.9 percent on
average, see Table 1.
But four countries deviate significantly from this European average. These are Luxem-
bourg, Ireland and Portugal with average growth rates of roughly three percent or even
higher and Sweden with a considerably lower growth rate of only 1.3 percent. Across
the other countries there are no remarkable differences in the economic performance.
But the variability of growth measured as the standard deviation of the growth rates
varies remarkably across countries. Compared with the EU-15 variability, growth is
much more volatile in Finland, Luxembourg and Ireland. Two of these three countries
were already mentioned with respect to growth rates which are above average. The
highest growth rates obtained in the sample period range from nine to ten percent –
again for Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland. But also the sharpest decline in economic
growth happened in two of these countries, namely Luxembourg with –7.9 percent and
Portugal with –8.2 percent. Testing for normality of the growth rates for later purposes
leads to a rejection for Luxembourg, Finland, and Portugal at least at the five percent
level of significance, see last column in Table 1. Obviously Luxembourg, Portugal,
Ireland, and to a minor extent Finland seem to play a special role within the EU.
Table 2: Contemporaneous Correlation of Per Capita Growth
A B DK G FI F GR IR IT LU NL P SP SW UK
11
A 1 .62 .34 .62 .36 .71 .35 -.05 .61 .20 .54 .63 .56 .21 .25
B .83 1 .32 .62 .44 .82 .44 .09 .79 .41 .66 .65 .68 .44 .30
DK .28 .46 1 .49 .23 .32 .43 -.10 .34 .28 .42 .28 .17 .24 .58
G .78 .72 .04 1 .12 .66 .52 -.08 .69 .31 .65 .52 .41 .22 .38
FI .22 .38 .85 -.18 1 .51 .30 .25 .43 .12 .20 .31 .38 .75 .53
F .74 .96 .65 .57 .58 1 .55 .16 .75 .36 .61 .71 .66 .39 .50
GR .49 .62 .74 .38 .44 .63 1 .14 .22 .08 .35 .35 .34 .24 .43
IR .55 .67 .64 .10 .87 .75 .45 1 -.07 -.02 .25 .07 .25 .08 .12
IT .79 .89 .45 .46 .39 .88 .55 .68 1 .43 .60 .60 .45 .50 .43
LU -.67 -.88 -.44 -.52 -.50 -.89 -.51 -.75 -.74 1 .47 .52 .43 .04 .45
NL .82 .87 .51 .71 .51 .87 .56 .71 .67 -.90 1 .47 .59 .27 .35
P .71 .67 -.11 .71 .02 .49 .26 .43 .43 -.70 .72 1 .65 .04 .46
SP .93 .94 .45 .71 .40 .87 .68 .71 .86 -.83 .89 .75 1 .36 .44
SW .53 .70 .85 .11 .83 .84 .65 .86 .81 -.68 .64 .13 .68 1 .43
UK -.02 .10 .81 -.35 .92 .36 .24 .63 .15 -.18 .26 -.32 .09 .68 1
Note: figures below the diagonal refer to the sample period 1990-97; figures above the diagonal refer to
the sample period 1971-97
 At least for Luxembourg this statement is confirmed by looking at the contemporane-
ous correlation of per capita growth which are displayed in Table 2.  This table con-
tains bivariate correlation coefficients first for the whole sample period 1971 to 1997,
these figures are given in the upper triangle of Table 2, and second for the period 1990
to 1997, these are the bold figures below the main diagonal. Starting with the lower
part of Table 2, the perhaps most striking result is the high negative correlation be-
tween Luxembourg and all the other countries since the nineties. This result is even
more puzzling when looking at Belgium, keeping in mind that both countries perform a
small monetary union for a long time. For Belgium we find a strong positive correla-
tion with the other EU-countries, being somewhat weaker for the Nordic countries and
lowest for the UK. There are some additional patterns in the Table. As a tendency per
capita growth in the Nordic countries comes up with  higher contemporaneous correla-
tions with the UK as well as within the Nordic region than for the continental Euro-
pean countries.
Another point to comment on is the rather low correlation of Germany with France and
with Italy as well as with the Nordic countries. British and German business cycles are
negatively correlated which means that business cycle movements in both countries
move in the opposite direction. The German business cycle is highly correlated with
Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. From this one can conclude that there is no
12
reason to fear that Germany will dominate in EMU. Comparing the correlation coeffi-
cients for the whole as well as for the shorter period and ignoring Luxembourg, the
coefficients are by and large higher than those obtained for the whole period. But the
picture is by no means unique in the sense that this statement will hold for all of the
fifteen countries. A counterexample can be seen in the UK.
Further insights into the European business cycles can be obtained by calculating bi-
variate cross correlation coefficients. For these figure to have a meaningful interpret-
tion the data should be stationary. Therefore, we first looked at the autocorrelogram of
Table 3:  Cross Correlation with EU-11 GDP Growth Rates
Country Lag Lead
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Austria -.20 -.13  .05 .22 .75* .26 -.21  .32 -.08
Belgium -.10  .05  .02 .15 .82* .18 -.03  .02 -.07
West Germany -.15 -.06 -.20 .33 .79* .07 -.07  .11 -.14
France -.30  .09  .22 .28 .72* .12 -.20 -.01 -.10
Finland  .13  .00  .13 .23 .15     -.11 -.28 -.20 -.33
Ireland -.07 -.28  .05 .26 .05 .21 -.15 -.27 -.00
Italy -.08  .14 -.08    -.02 .80* .15 -.17  .01 -.12
Luxembourg -.13  .09  .04 .01 .47* .09 -.13 -.21 -.16
Netherlands -.18  .06  .18 .22 .73* .14 -.11 -.12 -.17
Portugal -.18  .02 -.04 .27 .75* .25 -.09  .02 -.13
Spain                         .13     .15     .23     .33      .63*    .25      -.17     -.13     -.12
Denmark  .19  .09 -.09 .23 .39*   -.52*-.43* -.07 -.22
Sweden  .28  .14  .02 .18 .31      -.07-.17 -.19 -.37*
Great Britain  .09  .29  .07 .48* .36 -.31 -.39* -.28 -.29
Greece -.16  .00 -.06 .61* .49* -.03   .01 -.07 -.05
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: * indicates a 5 % significant cross correlation coefficient at the corresponding lead/lag. Lag: c[dlog
yEU(t), dlog yCountry(t-i)]; Lead:  c[dlog yEU(t), dlog yCountry(t+i)]; c = cross correlogram; country = single Euro-
pean country, EU = EU-11, i = 0,..,4. For the EMU-countries their contribution to the EU-11 GDP has been
subtracted.
each series. If the Q-statistic calculated for ten lags indicated that growth follows a
white noise process, no further tests were applied. This happened to ten countries as
well as to the GDP growth rates of EU-11. In five cases, namely Finland, Portugal,
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Spain, Sweden, and the UK, the Q-statistic rejected the white noise hypothesis at the
five percent level of significance. For these cases we performed the augmented
Dickey-Fuller-test afterwards. Except for Spain, for the other four countries nonsta-
tionarity has to be rejected at the 1 % level of significance. For Spain stationarity can
be accepted at the 5 % level. From these results it follows that the cross correlation
coefficients can be interpreted in the usual manner. Table 3 presents the results.
The cross correlation coefficients are calculated for the whole sample period using
four leads and lags in each case. We take EU-11 as the reference value. If a coefficient
is larger than twice its standard error we consider it as significantly different from
zero. These coefficients are marked with an asterix in Table 3. Starting with the EMU-
member countries there is no statistically significant lead or lag structure in the growth
rates with respect to EU-11 growth. For nine out of eleven countries we find a signifi-
cant contemporaneous correlation with the European business cycle, being highest for
Belgium and lowest for Luxembourg. But it has to be noted that for two countries,
Finland and Ireland, there is no statistical link to the European business cycle.
Except for the last mentioned countries the contemporaneous cross correlations are
higher or of equal size for the participating countries than for the not participating
countries. This may be taken as some evidence of a higher degree of synchronization
across the EMU-member states than the EU as a whole. Following the results, the
Danish business cycle shows a clear leading pattern up to two years. In addition the
Danish business cycle moves in the opposite direction compared with EU-11. The
Greek business cycle lags one year behind, although there are also contemporaneous
effects with EU-11. No clear-cut pattern can be obtained from the British data; there
are statistically significant leads and lags, but no contemporaneous effects. For Sweden
there seems to be a four years lead; but this results seems somewhat implausible and
may be due to the short data series.
So far we addressed the question of business cycle synchronization among the EU-15.
Now we take a brief look at the convergence process across Europe. For this issue we
look at the developments of real GDP per capita for the period 1970 to 1997. Figure 2
14
shows the corresponding scatter plot with the regression line included. On the hori-
zontal axis real per capita GDPs in 1970 and on the vertical axis real per capital GDPs
in 1997 are plotted. Additionally we show the estimated slope of the OLS regression of
1997 GDPs on 1970 GDPs. Roughly 80 percent of the variation in per capita income
can be attributed to the income variation that already existed in 1970, as the first equa-
tion in Table 4 below shows.
      Figure 2: Real per capita GDP in 1970 and 1997
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Whereas the constant term is statistically not different from zero at the usual signifi-
cance levels, the slope coefficient is different from zero at the one percent level. The
slope coefficient tells us that despite of the constant term per capita income grew of
around 40 % compared with the 1970  per capita income level of the countries. The
15
statistically insignificant intercept suggests that there was no autonomous increase in
per capita income during this time period.
For countries on or close to the regression line in Figure 2 we can conclude that their
per capita income growth evolved proportionately to the starting point in 1970. From
this it follows that among these countries neither convergence nor divergence took
place. The regression line separates those countries which come up with an over- or
under-proportionate per capita income growth. Dots above the line indicate over-
proportional and dots below the line under-proportional growth. Only in Luxembourg,
Table 4: Least Squares Results of Growth and Convergence Estimates for EU-15
PER CAPITA GROWTH: b-CONVERGENCE
Endogenous Var.: Log (YC97) Average Growth Rates
Constant 3.422 (1.694)  0.038      (5.485)
Log(YC70) 1.404 (7.407) -0.00719 (2.321)
R2(adj.) 0.794  0.239
DW-Statistic 2.280  1.575
SER 2.580  3.600
No. of Obs. 15  15
Remarks: Empirical t-values are reported in brackets, R2(dj) i  the coefficient of determination adjusted for
degrees of freedom, DW-Stat is the Durbin-Watson statistics for first order serial correlation, and SER is the
standard error of regression.
Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in Finland  per capita income grew faster than the aver-
age, whereas Portugal, Greece and Sweden show up with an under-proportionate
growth. For the remaining nine countries their relative position within the Community
remained more or less unchanged compared with their position in 1970. With respect
to EU-11, the countries Luxembourg, Finland, and Portugal show a different growth
performance than the other ones.
16
Further insights into the convergence process can be obtained by looking at the so
called unconditional b-convergence. This convergence concept provides information
whether countries with a per capita income below average at some starting point catch
Figure 3: s-Convergence in Europe
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up in the course of time to those countries with per capita income above average.
Catching up implies that the former poor countries show up with higher growth rates
than the former rich countries. Estimating the so called Barro regression for EU-15 for
the period 1970 to 1997 leads to the results presented in the last column of Table 4.
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the five percent level at least and they
show the expected signs. Using the estimated slope coefficient to calculate the speed
of convergence one obtains an estimated rate of 0.8 % (see Sala-i-Martin [1996]). This
figure means that the relative distance between a poor and a rich country reduces by
0.8 % per annum. Thus we find convergence within the EU-15, but it takes place only
very slowly.
17
Given that b-convergence exists among the European countries, one can look addition-
ally at the s-convergence which is plotted for the EU-15 and the EU-10 (Luxembourg
excluded) in Figure 3. s-convergence is based on the standard deviations of the log of
per capita GDP. s-convergence prevails if the standard deviations decline in the course
of time. As Figure 3 shows this was the case in the early seventies as well as from
1985 onwards. From 1985 on s-convergence was stronger for the EU-10 countries
than for the EU as a whole. For the subgroup the standard deviation declined from
0.42 in 1970 to 0.33 in 1997, whereas for the EU-15 this measure fell from 0.46 to
0.39. Considered as a whole there is convergence among the European countries, but
the process differs somewhat for EU-15 and EU-11.
III. Differences in Business Cycle Fluctuations within EU-15
In the previous section we primarily looked at the average growth rates of the EU-
member countries. But despite of an equal mean in the national growth rates, there is
still another source with could lead to a temporary divergence in the economic devel-
opments, namely the dispersion around the mean. Countries with more volatile growth
rates in both directions are able to put pressure on the whole system in at least two
ways. A nationally overheating economy usually experiences pressure on the price
system leading to a new or to an enforced inflationary process. In the past national
central banks could prevent this situation by conducting a tight monetary policy. This
mechanism is no longer available under EMU. If the overheating economy is large
relative to EU-11, the ECB may decide to follow a restrictive monetary policy and thus
affecting adversely the development in the other countries. In the opposite case of a
deep recession with high unemployment in a country a coordinated policy mix eventu-
ally could help to overcome this situation in the past. Again, on a national base a pol-
icy like this can no longer be deployed due to the restrictions imposed by EMU. Ther-
fore,
18
 Table 5: ANOVA-Results for Selected EU-Areas – 1971 – 1997
   EU-15: EU-11 EU-Core
Hypothesis: Means between the series are equal
F-Statistic 1.71*** (14, 120)1.65***(10, 286)0.52 (4, 130)
Between SS 0.0137 (14) 0.0100 (10) 0.0006 (4)
Within SS 0.2234 (390) 0.1723 (286) 0.0399 (130)
Total SS 0.2372 (404) 0.1823 (296) 0.0406 (134)
Hypothesis: Variances between the series are equal
Bartlett-Test 59.50* (14) 51.01* (10) 3.46 (4)
Levene-Test 2.39* (14, 390) 2.70* (10, 286) 0.83 (4, 130)
Brown-Forsythe-Test 2.19* (14, 390) 2.44* (10, 286) 0.68 (4, 130)
__________________________________________________________________________________
Note: *, (**), (***) indicates rejection of the null at the 1, (5), (10) % level. SS = sum of squares
Core = Austria, Belgium,  West-Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Figures in brackets are the
degrees of freedom.
it is not only important for the business cycles to move synchronous, but the cycles
should also exhibit a similar degree of dispersion around the mean. To test for a com-
mon mean as well as a common variance, we perform a simple analysis of variance for
the EU-countries. The results of the ANOVA are given in Table 5 for the whole sam-
ple period.
In the upper part of Table 5 we test for equality of the means of per capita growth for
the EU-15, the EU-11 as well as for the EU-core, consisting of Austria, Belgium, West
Germany, the Netherlands, and France. The corresponding F-statistics reveal that dif-
ferences in the means are important for EU-15 as well as for EU-11, but not for the
members of EU-core. Nevertheless, the evidence is rather weak because equality of the
means is rejected at the ten percent level only. A closer inspection by dividing the
sample period into different sub-periods reveals that differences in the mean were not
present for the seventies and the eighties, but are highly significant for the nineties, see
Table A2 in the appendix.
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More important than differences in the average growth rates are the differences in the
variances. The test of equality of variances between the series was performed by using
the Barlett-, the Levene- and the Brown-Forsythe-procedure9. Basically, these test dis-
tinguish with respect to a violation of the assumption of normality. In our case all tests
reveal the same information, namely that equality of the variances between the series is
strongly rejected at the one percent level of significance for EU-15 and EU-11, but not
for the EU-core countries. These results pertain when running the tests for the sub-
periods. For all sub-periods the Barlett-test rejects equality of variances for EU-15 and
EU-11, but not for EU-core. Differences in the test results occur for the seventies.
Here the other tests indicate that the assumption of a common variance cannot be re-
jected at the usual significance levels. These conflicting results are due to a lack of
normality in the seventies, and the Barlett test is sensitive to a violation of this as-
sumption. The more important results in our view relate to the differences in volatility
which are still present in the eighties and the nineties. For the EU-core all tests give
the same results. Equality of the variances cannot be rejected neither for the whole p-
riod nor for the three decades.
Increasing the number of members of EU-core step by step with the omitted countries
from EU-11 and eliminating the newly added country when the tests reject equality of
variance, it is Luxembourg, Finland and Ireland which caused the tests for EU-11 to
fail.
IV. On the Importance of Country-specific and Common Shocks
As a next step in the analysis we decompose the variations in the series into character-
istic of a country i, into country specific shocks as well as into shocks which are com-
mon to all economies. To proceed along this line, we set up the following formal
                                                 
9  The Barlett est of homogeneity of variances i based on the deviations of the data from the mean and cru-
cially depends on the normality assumption. A robust measure of the central location is used instead in the
Levene test. Brown and Forsythe modified the Levene test by using an even mor robust measure of the central
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model which was also applied by Karras (1996), Stockman (1988) and Bayoumi and
Prasad (1997) although in a slightly different context.
Let Dyit denote real per capita GDP growth in country i at time t, then the regression
we run takes the form
Dyit =  ci  +  vt  +  eit                                             (1)
with ci  a country-specific constant, vt a shock at time t common to all countries, and eit
a country i specific shock at time t. ci as well as vt are (0,1). The country-specific con-
stant takes on the value 1 for country i, a d 0 elsewhere. Correspondingly, the time
dummies are 1 for a certain year and zero elsewhere. The constant for each country i is
introduced to allow for country specific issues, captured not elsewhere in the model.
The country i specific shock at time t, eit, is unobservable and is, therefore, captured by
the residuals of the regression. In terms of an analysis of variance, ci are the fixed
economy effects and vt are time-effects. If the fixed-effects assumption is supported by
the data, then the implication is that the countries under investigation move along dif-
ferent growth paths, i.e. they are diverging. Furthermore, a comparison of the common
shocks vt with the country-specific shocks eit provides evidence on the relative impor-
tance of both types of shocks an economy is confronted with. Supposed that the coun-
try-specific shocks are more important than the common shocks, this will be strong
evidence against the expected stability of EMU, because the dominance of country
specific shocks will tend to put pressure on the system as a whole. On the contrary, if
the common shocks dominate the country- specific shocks in size, then the inherent
stability of the monetary union will be sufficient  to absorb these shocks without af-
fecting one or a few countries adversely. Although the model contains only (0,1)
dummy variables, it can be derived from a structural economic model as Stockman
[1988] has shown.
                                                                                                                                              
location which is found to be robust under nonnormality. For details ee Conover, Johnson and Johnson [1981],
Brown and Forsythe [1974] and Levene [1960].
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Several extensions to the above specifications have been made, following the proce-
dure suggested by Karras (1996). First, there is a strong presumption that growth rates
are autocorrelated over the business cycle. Therefore, it seems natural to account for
this by reformulating the above model to
Dyit =  ci  +  vt  +  rDyi,t-1   +  eit                     (2)
which assumes that persistence is equal across countries and persistence is measured
by r, the coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable. If this assumption seems to be
too strong, it might be relaxed by assuming that persistence is different in each coun-
try. In this case the basic specification modifies to
Dyit =  ci  +  vt  +  riDyi,t-1   +  eit                 (3)
In all these cases appropriate tests can be performed; they are reported below. The next
point we have to consider relates to the estimation procedure. Given that persistence is
not significant in a statistical sense, the basic specification can be estimated by OLS.
But if there is considerable correlation among the contemporaneous error terms, this
should be taken into account by estimating the equation by SUR (seemingly unrelated
regression) instead of OLS. SUR will improve the efficiency of the estimates in the
sense that the reported t-values are reliable whereas the t-values obtain by OLS are not,
if the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix is not diagonal.
In cross section regressions heteroskedasticity is a quite common problem. As far as
possible we account for this deficiency by calculating the standard errors of the coeffi-
cients by White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance procedure (White1980).
Figure 4: Sequential testing of the hypotheses
1st  Step: H:  ri = 0     (no persistence)
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                             accepted                     rejected
                                                   H:  ri = r  (equal                 G:  ri ¹ r (different
                                                                     persistence)                        persistence)
         Dyit = ci + vt + eit     Dyit = ci + vt + rDyit-1 +eit     Dyit = ci + vt + riDyit-1 +eit
2nd Step: H: ci = c   (there are no country differences)
                       accepted                                               rejected
                 Dyit = c + vt + eit (+ AR)                     Dyit = ci + vt + eit (+ AR)
3rd Step: H: vt = 0 for all t  (there are no common shocks)
                            accepted                                                 rejected
                                                                        H: vt = v                       G: vt ¹ v
       Dyit = c + eit (+AR) or             Dyit = m + eit (+AR) or     Dyit = ci +vt+eit (+AR)
       Dyit = ci + eit (+AR)                 Dyit = ci + v + eit (+AR)   Dyit = c +vt+eit (+AR)
As before we split the cross section units into EU-15, EU-11 and EU-core. For each of
these (sub-) groups we started with the basic specification, tested for persistence and
performed several tests. As it turned out for all country groups significant serial corre-
lation was present. Testing for a common first order autocorrelation coefficient against
a country specific one, the decision was always in favor of the latter. Therefore, we
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base the presentation upon the results of the third variant of the model. The results of
the various tests performed for the three groups of countries are given in Table 6.
For each country group we performed five tests, see Figure 4 for a graphical presenta-
tion. First we tested H: ri = 0 for all i, with i indexing the countries in the groups. If
this hypothesis could not be rejected, we continued by testing whether H: ri = r olds
for all i. In either case depending on the results, the a tocorrelation structure was
specified. Next we tested for the joint significance of the country-specific as well as
the time-specific effects. With respect to the country-specific effects we checked
whether H: ci  = c, for all i, holds. In this case the test indicates that there are no sig-
nificant differences in the country-specific effects and the model is estimated with a
common constant term. If H is to be rejected, to opposite conclusion holds. The next
tests relate to
Table 6: Results of Wald Tests for Different Country Groups1)
EU-15 EU-11 EU-core
H: ri = 0 for all i F = 3.848 (1 %) 4.400 (1%) 6.808 (1%)
H: ri  =  r,  for all i F = 2,358 (1%) 2.972 (1%) 8.491 (1%)
H: ci  = c, for all i F = 1.196 1.427 1.973
H: vt  = 0, for all tF = 12.869 (1%) 10.681 (1%) 23.246 (1%)
H: vt  = v,  for all tF = 13.178 (1%) 10.844 (1%) 23.642 (1%)
1) Results are based on joint F-tests; level of significance is given in brackets. All results are based on
OLS-regression with  White eteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.
the time-effects. Again, we first tested if the time-effects are jointly zero, i.e. H: vt  =
0, for all t. Given that this hypothesis hold, no further test was conducted. In the oppo-
site case we finally tested if all time-effects are equal, i.e., H: vt  = v,   for all t.
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As already mentioned for all country groups we find significant persistence in per cap-
ita real growth which, in addition, turns out to be country-specific10, see the first two
rows of Table 6. Also for all country groups we find time-specific effects which are
significantly different from zero on one hand, and which vary from country to country
on the other. In terms of shocks this result suggests that common shocks hit the
economies quite differently. Only with respect to the country-specific effects, captured
by the ci’s, no significant differences between the European countries can be detected.
This result indicates “good news” in the sense the EU-countries do not move along
diverging growth paths despite of common and country-specific shocks, to which we
turn now.
Figure 5: Common Shocks of the Models
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EU15
EU11
EU core
Common Shocks to EU-15, EU-11 and EU-core
Figure 5 shows the development of the common shocks over time for the three country
groups. The plots are obtained by taking the estimated coefficients of the time-effect
dummies of the three models.
                                                 
10  This result is in contrast to Karras‘ finding who reports a unique serial correlation coefficient when estima-
ting the model for twenty European countries for the period 1950 to 1990.
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At a first sight Figure 5 displays a very similar movement of the common shocks for
the three country groups over time. Also formal tests of equality of means of the series
as well as equal variances do not detect any significant differences. The common
shocks range from slightly more than 2 % in 1973 to around –4% in 1975 and 1993,
respectively. As the Figure suggests adverse shocks remain in the range of 0 to –4%
over the sample period, whereas  positive shocks were stronger in the seventies than in
the end of the eighties. Note that in nearly all of the nineties the European economies
were hit by adverse shocks.11 It hould be noted that the size of the common shocks is
quite considerable compared with the average growth rates reported in Table 1. Given
these sizable  common shocks on the one hand, and the country-specific persistence in
growth rates, there is a potential danger in all country groups that a common shock
may lead to an asymmetric adjustments in the single countries.
But common shocks are just one side of a coin, the other relates to country-specific
shocks which are measured by the residuals of the models. Figure 6 shows these
shocks for the EU-15 model. For some countries these shocks are much greater than
the common shocks. Negative country shocks affected e.g. France and Finland in the
nineties in magnitude which exceeds the size of the common shocks to a considerable
extend. But also for Luxembourg as well as Ireland country-specific shocks seem to be
much more important than common shocks. In order to get an impression of the im-
portance of both types of shocks, we calculated a relative dispersion measure as has
been done by Karras (1996). For this purpose we divided the variance of the countries’
Figure 6: Country-specific Shocks Based on the EU-15 Model
                                                 
11 The statistical model used in the paper does not allow to distinguish between the shocks, i.e. whether we are
confronted with supply shocks of with demand shocks. To address this issue structural VARs are usually
applied.
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residuals by the variance of the common shocks, Table 7 displays the results for the
three country groups.
Values of the relative dispersion measure above unity indicate that country-specific
shocks are more important that common a shocks to a country. Values between zero
and one show that common shocks are more relevant to a country than country-specific
ones. The closer the measure is to zero, the less important are country-specific shocks
relative to the common shocks.
Table 7: The Relative Importance of Common and Country-Specific Shocks
Country EU-15 Ranking EU-11 Ranking EU-core Ranking
Austria 0.622 4 0.574 6 0.338 3
Belgium 0.388 2 0.324 2 0.225 2
France 0.191 1 0..191 1 0.206 1
Netherl. 0.511 3 0.426 3 0.345 4
Germany 0.756 7 0.806 7 0.411 5
Finland 2.167 12 2.113 9
Ireland 3.436 14 3.158 11
Italy 0.650 6 0.527 5
Luxemb. 3.644 15 3.130 10
Portugal 2.543 13 2.084 8
Spain 0.641 5 0.472 4
Denmark 0.983 8
Sweden 1.003 9
UK 1.224 10
Greece 1.891 11
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In Table 7 the corresponding figures are given together with a ranking of the country
within the special group. Values of this measure above unity are presented in bold let-
ters. Starting with EU-15,  for seven countries country-specific shocks are much more
important than common shocks. Out of these seven countries four are members of
EMU since 1999. Furthermore, it should be noted that all of the non-participating
countries show relative dispersion measures which are clearly below to those of the
joining countries. For Sweden both types of shocks are of equal importance, whereas
for the United Kingdom, country-shocks are somewhat more important. Ireland and
Luxembourg, followed by Portugal are the countries which are most affected by coun-
try-specific shocks. On the opposite, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are coun-
tries which are dominated by common shocks. West Germany ranks in the middle of
the countries with a ration of 0.756. Things change not much when switching to EU-
15. Again, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands rank on places one to three. Only for
the EU-core we find ratios for all countries which are clearly below unity. For all core
countries common shocks clearly dominate in importance.
V.  Conclusion
In the paper we analyzed the business cycles in the EU-15 countries with respect to
their common pattern. Furthermore, we looked at two subgroups, namely EU-11 and at
five “core” countries. With the start of EMU several instruments such as exchange rate
changes or interest changes are no longer at the disposal of a single member country to
absorb adverse shocks. The loss of these instruments calls for new adjustment mecha-
nisms if in the past the single countries used these monetary instruments more or less
extensively and if asymmetric shocks are still to be expected to the same extent. For
EMU to be an optimal currency area, several requirements must be fulfilled. If shocks
hitting single countries are dominated to a large extent by common shocks and if busi-
ness cycles move rather synchronous across the countries, then the requirement of new
adjustment instruments such as wages or prices is of minor importance than in the case
where shocks are basically dominated by country-specific shocks. In the latter case,
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EMU may be plagued by an inherent latent instability due to divergent business cycle
movements of its members. In order to be able to smooth such asymmetric shocks,
much of the necessary adjustments have to be carried by the labor markets. Our results
suggest that the probability of asymmetric shocks seems to be rather high for EU-15 as
well as for EU-11. Country-specific shocks turned out to be highly important for the
smaller countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, and Portugal. This means that
although EMU as a whole will be less affected by asymmetric shocks, these small
countries will nevertheless be seriously disturbed by country-specific shocks.
But judged as a whole, the starting conditions for EMU are rather good for several rea-
sons. First, our results suggest that there are no important country-specific differences
in the per capita output growth. This implies that the EU-15 countries move along the
same growth path, at least in the long run. Secondly, the not yet participating countries
are much more similar in their business cycle movements as well as in the shocks these
countries are confronted with than the already participating countries with the high
dependence on country-specific shocks. Therefore, an enlargement of EMU to all EU-
15 countries will not add further problems.
In the paper we only analyzed the questions of business cycle synchronization as well
as the types of shocks disturbing an economy. For the types of shocks we only looked
whether these shocks are common to all economies or if there are some countries for
which country-specific shocks are highly important. We did not focus on the nature or
the origin of the shocks, i.e. are the shocks supply- or demand-determined. For these
additional insights an alternative methodology is required such as structural VARs.
Furthermore, we proceeded at a highly aggregated level by looking at per capita output
growth. Disaggregating the data on a sectoral basis and testing at this level is left for
future research. Finally, besides of growth aspects it seems fruitful to extend the analy-
sis also to the labor markets because for EMU, these markets will be the cornerstones
for synchronizing the European business cycles.
Appendix A: Additional Results
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Table A1: ANOVA-Results for Selected EU-Areas
1971-1979 1980-1989 1990-1997
EU-15:
Equality of Means Between Series
F-Statistic 0.47 (14, 120) 1.26 (14,135) 3.28* (14, 105)
Between SS 0.0054 (14) 0.0068 (14) 0.0207 (14)
Within SS 0.0977 (120) 0.0519 (135) 0.0473 (105)
Total SS 0.1031 (134) 0.0586 (149) 0.0680 (119)
Equality of Variances Between Series
Bartlett 29.49* (14) 31.23* (14) 38.66* (14)
Levene 1.37 (14, 120) 3.61* (14, 135) 4.56* (14, 105)
Brown-Forsythe 0.97 (14, 120) 2.68* (14, 135) 3.32* (14, 105)
EU-11:
Equality of Means Between Series
F-Statistic 0.24 (10, 88) 1.36 (10, 99) 3.61* (10,77)
Between SS 0.002 (10) 0.005 (10) 0.018 (10)
Within SS 0.075 (88) 0.039 (99) 0.038 (77)
Total SS 0.077 (98) 0.045 (109) 0.056 (87)
Equality of Variances Between Series
Bartlett 25.26* (10) 25.62* (10) 33.96* (10)
Levene 1.56 (10, 88) 4.15* (10, 99) 5.39* (10, 77)
Brown-Forsythe 1.17 (10, 88) 2.92* (10, 99) 4.16* (10, 77)
EU-Core (A, B, West-G, NL, F):
Equality of Means Between Series
F-Statistic 0.53 (4, 40) 0.27 (4, 45) 0.69 (4, 35)
Between SS 0.001 (4) 0.0002 (4) 0.001 (4)
Within SS 0.015 (40) 0.0099 (45) 0.008 (35)
Total SS 0.016 (44) 0.0101 (49) 0.009 (39)
Equality of Variances Between Series
Bartlett 2.72 (4) 2.62 (4) 4.37 (4)
Levene 0.92 (4,40) 0.83 (4, 45) 1.14 (4, 35)
Brown-Forsythe 0.46 (4, 40) 0.78 (4, 45) 1.04 (4, 35)
__________________________________________________________________________________
Note: *, (**), (***) indicate significance at the 1, (5), (10) % level. SS = sum of squares
Core = Austria, Belgium,  West-Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Luxembourg has been excluded
due to its special situation as an international banking place. Figures in brackets are the degrees of free-
dom.
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